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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TITANIUM M E T A L S CORPORA-
TION OF AMERICA, A DELA-
WARE CORPORATION, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SPACE METALS, INC., a Corporation, 
and VALLEY BANK AND TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is a suit by the plaintiff-respondent against the 
defendant-appellant Bank in contract on a letter of credit. 
DISPOSITION BY LOWER COURT 
The matter was tried before the Third Judicial Dis-
trict Court, sitting without a jury. The Honorable Jo-
seph G. Jeppson rendered a judgment in favor of the 
plaintiff, Titanium Metals Corporation of America, and 
Case No. 
13474 
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against appellant, for the sum of $54,132.72 and costs of 
$22.00. The court found as a matter of fact and law that 
defendant Valley Bank and Trust Company, had obligated 
itself under a letter of credit and had waived certain con-
ditions thereof. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant-Appellant, Valley Bank and Trust Com-
pany seeks reversal of the judgment. 
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Respondent's statement of the facts is essentially 
correct, however, several points need clarification. 
First, Respondent's Brief, is not clear on the critical 
point that three separate letters of either guarantee or 
credit were issued by Valley Bank and Trust Company 
to Titanium Metals Corporation of America. 
A. The first letter guaranteed the payment of 
invoices. All invoices submitted by Titanium Metals 
to Valley Bank under this letter were paid. 
B. The second letter of credit differed in its 
terms from the first letter of credit and agreed to 
pay all collection drafts. I t did not agree to pay in-
voices. Titanium continued to send invoices. The 
Bank never paid on an invoice covered by this letter 
of credit. 
C. The third letter of credit issued by the Bank 
also agreed to pay collection drafts. Titanium con-
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tinned to send invoices. This first invoice under this 
third letter of credit was paid by Space Metals, Inc., 
after Valley Bank sent it to Space Metals and re-
fused to pay it. The remaining six invoices were re-
turned by the Bank without payment. 
None of the invoices were accompanied by a collec-
tion draft or collection drafts, nor were any drafts with 
respect thereto furnished to Appellants at any other time. 
The record is clear on this point. 
In his statement of the facts, Respondent contends 
thai, "at no time did Valley Bank and Trust Company 
notify Titanium Metals that the procedure which it was 
utilizing in the sending of invoices to Valley Bank was 
improper and that such procedure should be remedied 
or altered to conform to a diffirent banking procedure 
and particularly that formal commercial drafts should be 
presented in order to collect for the shipments." I t is 
clear from this statement by Respondent that he assumes 
that Valley Bank had a duty to inform the Plaintiff Cor-
poration that they were using an improper procedure. 
This assumption is erroneous. Titanium knew the proper 
procedure from the letter of credit. Also, Respondent's 
statement that Valley Bank did not give them any notice 
that the procedure was not satisfactory is incorrect. 
This is belied by the facts. The only invoice paid under 
the third letter of credit was paid by Space Metals, Inc., 
not by the Bank. This certainly constitutes notice that 
the Bank is not paying upon presentation of invoices. 
The invoices were not paid on receipt as would occur 
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in relation to a draft on the letter of credit. The invoices 
were returned unpaid. The conduct and advice in con-
junction with the clearly stated terms of the letters of 
credit put Titanium on notice that collection drafts, not 
merely invoices were required, and that invoices would 
not be treated like drafts. 
I t is obvious from the record that Titanium's per-
sonnel had the sophistication necessary to be aware of 
what constitutes a draft and of how a draft differs from 
an invoice. The Court in questioning Titanium's witness 
asked the following question: "And what is a draft, do 
you know, in your business? Or would we have to ask 
a banker?" (R-148). And the Answer was as follows: 
"Well, we do use drafts in our business. A draft is a check 
drawn on a customer, drawn by us, which the Bank ac-
cepts and remits" (R-148). 
Respondent further contends that receipt of the 
drafts by Valley Bank and Trust Company was not essen-
tial and that if drafts; had been received they would 
have been treated in the same way as invoices. Testi-
mony in the record, which was previously cited in Appel-
lants' Brief, makes it clear that this was not then, and 
is not now, the case. Valley Bank and Trust Company's 
cashier testified that if drafts had been received, "we 
would have paid the draft and notified the customer" 
(R-200). This entire law suit has, as its reason for being, 
the fact that the invoices were not treated this way. 
Obviously, when invoices were presented under the sec-
ond and third letters of credit, Valley Bank and Trust 
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Company did not pay themjaMHrlt mmp the customer 
of the receipt of the invoice and mmb me customer's di-
rection. If the invoices had been paid Titanium would 
not be bringing this action, because they would have the 
money they are now seeking. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT APPELLANT WAIVED THE TERMS 
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT, BECAUSE 
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE OF WAIVER. 
Respondent's Brief states that there is a surfeiture 
of evidence establishing Valley Bank's waiver. The Brief 
reads: 
"The record is replete with statements by Bank 
officials which clearly support the lower Court's 
finding that the Bank did in fact waive strict 
compliance with the letter of credit in issue . . ." 
Not surprisingly, Respondent fails to point out any 
specific sitatements in the record which support this 
stand. Obviously, Respondent is unable to find any such 
references. 
The case of Phoenix Insurance Company v. Heath, 
et al, 90 Utah 87, 61 P. 2d 308 (1936), which was cited 
in Appellant's Brief, is examined by Respondent in his 
Brief. Respondent briefly relates the facts in Phoenix, 
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and states that the facts are very different from those 
in the instant case. The differences spoken of are not 
specified because fundamentally there are none. Ac-
tually, the situation in Phoenix is very similar to our 
situation, in that in both the case of Phoenix Insurance 
Company and of Valley Bank and Trust Company, there 
was never the slightest manifestation of an intent to 
waive any requirement. Respondent seams to feel that 
when the Court in Phoenix stated: 
"a waiver is an intentional relinquishment of a 
known right, (citation) To constitute a waiver, 
there must be an existing right, benefit, or ad-
vantage, a knowledge of this existence, and an 
intention to relinquish it. I t must be distinctly 
made, although it may be express or implied 
(citation)," (Emphasis added.) 
that the language express or implied is helpful to his 
cause, but Appellant is not refuting the fact that waiver 
may be express or implied. However, in our case, there 
was no distinct waiver made, either express or implied. 
Waiver cannot be found where there was: 
1. No intent. 
2. No distinct conduct which either impliedly 
or expressly waived the requirement of a 
draft. 
Respondent implies that Valley Bank and Trust Com-
pany had an affirmative duty to act, i.e. to give detailed 
prompt notice to Titanium that drafts were required. 
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Further, Respondent urges that since Valley Bank had 
this duty, its failure to give prompt detailed notice con-
stituted an inference of intent to waive and constituted 
an implied waiver. Valley Bank and Trust Company had 
no affirmative duty to tell Titanium that their procedure, 
of submitting an invoice instead of a draft, was improper. 
The letters of credit were clear as to proper procedure. 
Valley Bank and Trust Company had already spoken 
on this subject of proper procedure when it conditionally 
extended credit in its letters. 
Titanium Metals Corporation is not an artless or 
simple person thrown into a commercial jungle; but a 
sophisticated corporation of experts that commonly used 
Letters of Credit, Drafts, COD shipments, and other 
facets of the Law Merchant in conducting its Multi-State 
operations (R-148, et seq.). This corporation could have 
requested a change of the conditions, but it did not. 
The only communications between the corporations 
were: 
1. The Letters of Credit. 
2. Copies of Sales Orders marked "Invoice 
Copy" indicating payment within 30 days. 
3. Valley Bank's advice indicating receipt of 
invoices acknowledging Titanium's instruc-
tion to "Hold 30 days". 
4. Returned invoices accompanied by a cash-
ier's check purchased by Space Metals (so 
indicated on face of check) or Valley Bank's 
advice "we return herewith unpaid". 
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Respondent contends that VaJley Bank did not act 
immediately to inform Titanium of the existence of a 
problem and of its discontent. Respondent states, "Valley 
Bank and Trust Company never9 during the entire period 
in question, defined its position, expressed any discon-
tent" This statement is completely falacious. As dis-
cussed above, VaJley Bank and Trust Company had ex-
pressed ite position permanently and unambiguously in 
writings which Titanium had in its possession, i.e. the 
letters of credit. 
A draft on the Letters of Credit is a demand on the 
Bank and would have resulted in immediate credit. 
Titanium elected to charge the customer (Space 
Metals) and not the Bank and to extend 30 days credit 
to the customer. 
Is it the Bank's duty to say "Don't charge the custo-
mer or extend it credit — charge me"? Obviously not, 
for Titanium may have been reserving the Bank credit 
line for later use and it certainly is not the prerogative of 
the Bank to tell a non-customer when to use a line of 
credit. 
The Bank clearly indicated that it was not accepting 
these items by: 
1. Not paying them immediately as required by 
the letters of credit. 
2. Sending an advice indicating receipt of "In-
voke" or "Sales Draft". 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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3. Payment when remitted was indicated as 
being "Space Metal's Funds" not Bank funds 
on the check. 
4. The advices reflected Titanium Metal's In-
structions, "Hold for 30 days". 
Respondent indicates in his Brief that something 
more should have been done by Valley Bank. There is 
no authority for this belief. Neither case law nor statu-
tory authority is cited to establish a rule requiring Appel-
lant to do more in this situation. Nor did the letters of 
credit state that Appellants had an obligation to do more 
than they did. 
It seems clear, that the reason Respondent does not 
cite any authority for this proposition is that there is no 
obligation on Valley Bank to do more than they did. Val-
ley Bank did not fail to meet its obligations, it strictly 
followed the terms of the letters of credit. There was no 
conduct on Valley Bank's part which either impliedly or 
expressly waived the requirements of a draft. 
Reynolds v. Travelers Insurance Company, 176 Wash. 
36, 28 P. 2d 310, 314 (1934), which is cited in Respon-
dent's Brief, says that waiver is unilateral and arises by 
intentional relinquishment of a right. This is in keeping 
with the holdings of other cases in the area of waiver, 
including the Phoenix case. There is no indication in 
the Reynolds case that the facts in the present case 
would constitute an intention to waive. 
There was no course of conduct pursued by Valley 
Bank and Trust Company, which evidences an intention 
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to waive. Respondent states, on page 17 of his Brief, 
that, "the trial court clearly looked at the conduct of the 
Appellant as evidenced by the record" and based their 
determination on that conduct. However, Respondent 
never makes it clear to what conduct he is referring. There 
was no conduct on Valley Bank's part that indicated an 
intention to waive. This seems to be the reason why Re-
spondent does not pin point any conduct. 
Respondent states that Valley Bank waived strict 
compliance by "issuing and forwarding its drafts pur-
chased by Space Metals totaling more than $19,000 on 
a similar letter of credit covering an earlier period as 
evidenced by the first invoices shipment covered by the 
letter of credit." Respondent simply misstates the facts 
in this conclusion. Valley Bank did not issue any drafts 
but merely forwarded to Titanium checks purchased by 
Space Metals, Inc., which so indicated the purchaser. 
Respondent illustrates no facts constituting "waiver", 
nor does he even attempt to show facts indicating "Inten-
tion to Waive" or cite any cases involving similar facts 
and holding for waiver. 
There is no fact in the record upon which the court 
could base a finding of waiver, and since this is the ulti-
mate basis of the District Court decisions, the decision 
must fall. 
POINT II. 
STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS 
OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT SHALL NOT 
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BE WAIVED WHERE THERE IS NO CLEAR 
MANIFESTATION OF AN INTENT TO 
WAIVE. 
In Respondent's Brief, he implies that since the 
drafters of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) ex-
pressed a belief in flexibility and the importance of liberal 
interpretation, and since the UCC provisions are broad 
in scope, one cannot form any hard and fast rules in 
dealing with any situation covered by the provisions of 
the UCC. This is a ridiculous argument. The UCC 
clearly has flexibility, but, this does not mean that there 
are no rules established by the Code upon which a court 
can rely. As stated in Appellants' Brief, "Uniform Law 
Annotated", a West publishing company consolidation 
of the various Uniform Commercial Codes, sets forth the 
Rule on interpretation of letters of credit. That rule is 
as follows, "Generally — essential requirements of a letter 
of credit must be strictly complied with". (Section 5-104 
Note 1; Section 5-103 Note 1.) The purpose behind the 
requirement of strict compliance with the terms of a letter 
of credit is the promotion of easy, uncomplicated, and 
beneficial commercial transactions. When two people 
can enter into an agreement, i.e. a letter of credit agree-
ment, and can rely upon the terms of that letter of credit 
in the conducting of their business, commercial transac-
tions progress more easily and expeditiously. 
Respondent cites the case of Consolidated Sales Com-
pany, Inc. v. Bank of Hampton Roads, 193 Va. 307, 68 
68 S. E. 2d 652 (1952), which held that the Defendant 
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Bank by its conduct had waived strict compliance with 
the terms of the letters of credit involved. 
In that case, the Plaintiff began to make sales to the 
Bank's customer and he attached the requested draft to 
each of the first seven invoices submitted to the Bank 
for payment. Subsequently, some eighteen to twenty 
shipments were made by the Plaintiff and the Defendant 
Bank made payments for these shipments upon mere 
submission of invoices without drafts. The Court held, 
". . . by continuing to make payments upon receipt of 
the invoices alone, the bank had waived the provision in 
the letter which specified and had therefore required 
that a draft accompany the invoice." In our situation, 
the Bank did not continue to make payments under the 
second and third letters of credit when mere invoices 
were sent. Under the first letter of credit, which required 
only that invoices be sent, the Bank paid the invoices. 
Under the second and third letters of credit, where drafts 
were required, no invoices were paid. If an invoice were 
paid, Space Metals paid it, not the Bank. 
Richard v. Royal Bank of Canada, 23 F. 2d 430 (2d 
Cir. 1928), was also cited in Respondent's Brief. This 
case also involved lettens of credit. However, under the 
letters of credit in Ric/iard the drawing of drafts was 
not required. As the Count pointed out, the sending of 
drafts was assumed from the general language of the 
letter of credit, but was not required. Also, in Richard 
the Bank upon receipt of the documents (the documents 
were sent without drafts), made many payments. In 
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our case, Valley Bank never made payments under the 
terms of the second and third letters of credit when mere 
invoices were presented. 
Respondent's Brief states that a letter of credit shall 
be construed in the light most favorable to the recipient 
and that where there is ambiguity, the ambiguity shall 
be resolved in favor of the recipient. 
The case of Venizelos, S. A. v. Chase Manhattan 
Bank, 425 F. 2d 461, (2d Cir. 1917), is cited to substanti-
ate this point. Venizelos upholds the well known princi-
pal that it is preferable to construe an instrument so as 
to sustain it rather than so as to defeat it, if an instru-
ment is "fairly capable" of being so construed. Here, there 
is no ambiguity in the letters of credit. The terms in the 
letters of credit involved are explicit and clear. The 
letters of credit in this case are not "fairly susceptible" 
to two constructions. There is only one possible con-
struction and it requires Titanium Metals Corp. to sub-
mit drafts. 
POINT III. 
WAIVER WAS NOT PLED, THEREFORE 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE APPELLANT, VALLEY BANK 
AND TRUST COMPANY, WAIVED THE 
TERMS OF THE LETTER OF CREDIT. 
The whole purpose of the rules of pleading is to put 
the other side on notice of the theory upon which you 
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are relying. The rationale behind this rule can be easily 
understood. It is essential that each party be able to 
prepare effectively to meet the arguments of each other 
party. Here that kind of preparation was not possible. 
There was no way in which Appellant could anticipate 
and deal with the question of waiver since the issue was 
never pled nor averred to, during the course of the law 
suit. Waiver, in the present case, should have been pled 
so that Appellant, Valley Bank and Trust Company, 
could have dealt with this subject. It is clear on the facts 
that no conduct by Valley Bank and Trust Company 
constituted either an express or an implied waiver. How-
ever, evidence on this matter was never really considered 
because of the fact that waiver was never put into issue 
by the pleadings. 
The case of Commercial Standard Insurance Com-
pany v. Remay, 72 P. 2d 859 (1937), makes it clear that 
the Court won't take judicial notice of waiver if it is not 
pled. 
It is clear under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
that Appellant had no obligation to specifically mention 
waiver even if the opportunity had been present. Appel-
lant's Motion for new trial was broad enough in scope 
to cover Appellant's dissatisfaction with how waiver was 
handled. It is also apparent that Appellant's Motion to 
amend or alter findings of fact and conclusions of law 
covered the question of waiver and notified the Court 
and Respondent of Appellant's objection to the lack of 
pleadings of waiver. 
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The first discussion of waiver as a reason for recovery 
was at the time of preparation of the Findings of Fact 
and this is too late. 
Respondent also contends that there was testimony 
given to support the conclusion that the parties had 
"agreed" to a certain course of conduct, i.e. sending in-
voices instead of the requisite drafts, which Appellant 
now deems improper. Respondent goes on to say that 
Appellant, "should not be allowed mr alter the terms of 
the agreement which it voluntarily entered into and 
which later proved not to be in its best economic inter-
est". The only agreement Appellant had with Respon-
dent was the agreement laid out in the letters of credit. 
Appellant is not seeking to alter the terms of this agree-
ment, rather Appellant is seeking to enforce the terms 
of the agreement. Appellant never agreed to any sub-
stitution for the terms in the letters of credit. In short, 
the terms of the letters of credit establish the agreement 
between Appellant and Respondent, and these terms 
require strict compliance. 
POINT IV. 
WHERE IT APPEARS CLEAR THAT THE 
COURT HELD ON A THEORY NEITHER 
PLED, REVEALED, OR SUPPORTED BY 
THE EVIDENCE, THE TRIAL COURT'S 
JUDGMENT MUST BE OVERTURNED. 
The authority which was cited by Respondent in 
support of the idea that there is a presumption that the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Judgment of the trial court is correct, is not disputed 
by Appellant. However, where it appears, as it does 
here, that a court held on a theory not pled or revealed, 
the Trial Court's Judgment must be overturned. Appel-
lant had no notice of the theory upon which the court 
was relying until the court came out with its findings 
and Appellant immediately objected thereto. 
The case of Buckley v. Cox, 122 Utah 151, 247 P. 
2d 277 (1952), was cited by Respondent, and the law 
it states is probably applicable to our situation. The 
court in Buckley v. Cox made the following determina-
tion, "the question is whether the decision made by the 
trial court finds support in the evidence." Here the de-
cision finds no support in the evidence. Respondent claims 
that a "substantial amount of evidence in support of the 
trial court's decision" is present. Yet, he never says what 
this evidence is or where the evidence can be found in 
the record. Respondent does not allude to even one 
page in the record where this evidence can be found. 
Appellant has successfully met the burden of overcoming 
the presumption that the trial court's decision was cor-
rect. Appellant has made it clear that there was no evi-
dence at all in the record which showed waiver. Thus, 
from Respondent's own authority, Buckley v. Cox, 122 
Utah 151, 247 P. 2d 277 (1952), it is clear that some 
competent credible evidence was needed to support the 
findings made by the trial court. In our case, since 
there is no evidence, there can be no competent credible 
evidence. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
17 
CONCLUSION 
The only evidence of Waiver is opposing counsel's 
statement in his Brief. 
Officers of the Bank would have been discharged 
for the negligent misappropriation of depositors' funds 
if they had paid the invoices as though they were drafts. 
There was no contract to pay invoices. Therefore, Space 
Metals, Inc. could refuse to reimburse the Bank for the 
volunteered payment claiming the materials were de-
fective, not received, the payment not authorized, etc. 
The Plaintiff would have been richer and the Bank's 
depositors, stockholders and bonding Company poorer 
and without recourse against Space Metals. 
If a draft had been presented, the Bank would have 
paid it immediately, not 30 days later, as it would be a 
direct obligation of the Bank under the letter of credit. 
The Bank could then provide for payment to the Bank 
from Space Metals, Inc. under the agreements giving 
rise to the letter of credit. 
Since the Bank was not required to perform it had 
no reason to obtain payment from its customer, Space 
Metals, under the terms of its agreement with said Com-
pany. 
Space Metals, Inc. is now insolvent, there would 
have been no loss if Titanium Metals, Inc. had forwarded 
drafts because the Bank would have paid and secured re-
payment from its then solvent customer. The failure to 
provide drafts and its agreement extending time of pay-
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ment was solely Titanium Metal's responsibility and the 
proximate cause of their loss. If a loss must be taken, 
then the corporation who was not paid, because of its 
failure to comply with simple contract terms must ab-
sorb the loss. 
To hold otherwise, the Court must re-write the con-
tract between the parties and shift the loss to an innocent 
party. The Court must also create a very burdensome 
appendage on the Law Merchant which would substan-
tially inhibit the flow of commerce. 
The Plaintiff, a knowledgable and sophisticated for-
eign corporation, has tried to shift the loss incurred 
through its negligence to the Bank, who was playing 
the game by the established rules. There is neither legal, 
equitable or moral support for cause. 
It is respectfully submitted that the decision of the 
District Court should be reversed and a Judgment of no 
cause of action entered. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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